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Abstract: Satellite-based location and timing systems support a wide range of mass
market applications, typically using the GPS infrastructure. Until recently, these ap-
plications could not be used within safety-critical interfaces. Limits to the accuracy,
availability, integrity and continuity of the space-based signals prevented regulatory
agencies from certifying their use. Over the last three months, however, the latest
generation of augmented Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have been
approved for use in safety-related applications. They use a range of techniques to
overcome the limitations of previous infrastructures. This means that they can be
used as primary navigation tools in a wide range of interactive systems, including
aircraft cockpits, railway signalling tools etc. Unfortunately, a range of organisa-
tions including the UK Ministry of Defence, have raised concerns about our in-
creasing vulnerability to attacks on these satellite based architectures. These threats
are compounded by the difficulty of representing and reasoning about the impact of
jamming, spoofing and insider threats for the end-users of safety-critical systems. A
sudden loss of navigational support can undermine users confidence in complex ap-
plications and pose a significant threat to distributed situation awareness. We show
how formal reasoning techniques can be used to identify the safety and security
concerns that jeopardise interaction with future generations of Global Navigation
Satellite Systems applications.
Keywords: Safety Cases, Boolean Logic Driven Markov Processes, Cyber Security,
Global Navigation Satellite Systems
1 Introduction
This paper considers security and safety concerns for the users of Global Navigation Satellite
Systems (GNSS). Our concern is partly justified because there is a growing dependency on
timing and location information provided by these applications. This creates significant vul-
nerabilities for many different infrastructures across Europe and North America [Roy11]. First
generation GNSS architectures, such as GPS and GLONASS, suffer from a number of errors.
Some of these problems stem from satellite geometry. If all the satellites are closely grouped
together then the benefits of differential signal processing will be reduced. This tends to act as a
multiplier for errors induced from other sources. For instance, gravitational forces create subtle
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changes in the orbit of the satellites within a GNSS constellation. Further problems arise from
multipath effects. The signals arriving at a receiver are often reflected from large structures in-
cluding buildings. This creates inaccuracies of up to 75 meters in urban environments because
the reflected signal will take longer to arrive than a direct transmission. Further problems stem
from ionospheric effects. Radio waves can be considered to travel at the speed of light in outer
space. However, the ionizing effects of solar radiation form layers that refract electromagnetic
waves from satellite transmissions. Most end users do not correct for unforeseen changes such
as variations introduced by strong solar winds.
These errors and the lack of suitable correction mechanisms help to explain why first gen-
eration GNSS architectures have not been widely integrated into safety-related systems [BO07,
JY11]. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Required Naviga-
tion Performance provides minimum performance criteria for the use of these architectures in a
range of applications. These criteria are expressed in terms of Accuracy- how correct is the air-
crafts position estimate; Integrity- the largest aircraft position error can reach without detection;
Availability- how often can the aircraft use the systems with the desired accuracy and integrity;
Continuity - the probability that an operation once commenced can be completed and Time to
Alert the maximum interval before a performance issue is detected.
Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) address these limitations and are intended
to support Safety of Life (SoL) applications. These architectures include the North American
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and the Asian Multi-functional Satellite Augmenta-
tion System (MSAS) as well as the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EG-
NOS). These systems use a number of ground reference stations, to compare known information
about the time and their location with the signals received from the satellites to compute dif-
ferential corrections and integrity data for each monitored satellite. This information is collated
by a smaller number of master stations that then broadcast deviation corrections using a second
network of geostationary satellites. The corrections can then be applied to location information
derived from the GPS or GLONASS networks. Europe has just certified the EGNOS GNSS for
Safety of Life (SoL) applications, including approaches to aircraft runways. Further applications
are proposed, for example in railway signalling, where exact information about the speed and
position of trains can be used to ensure adequate separation without locking sections of track, as
in conventional approaches.
The EGNOS infrastructure uses redundancy to address many of these concerns in SoL ap-
plications. For instance, each of the four master stations rotates from being the Master to a
Hot-Back-Up and then to be a Cold-Back-Up. The complexity of the underlying design created
a host of human factors concerns. In particular, configuration and maintenance posed particular
challenges given the potential consequences of errors by the systems engineering teams. The
design of this infrastructure was, therefore, guided by the assumption that no single operator
error would lead to a loss of integrity. This has significant implications in terms of the security
assessments in later sections; it is less clear whether this level of protection might also be offered
against deliberate attacks.
The complex and critical nature of satellite based augmentation systems also justifies the use
of formal analysis techniques. Numerous mathematical studies were made of the underlying
algorithms to establish the correctness of the relationships between the signals received by the
ground reference stations and the differential corrections as well as the reliability information
Proc. FMIS 2011 2 / 18
ECEASST
broadcast to the eventual end users. However, the reliability analysis was driven by semi-formal
techniques based on Failure Modes, Effects and Critical Analysis. The results from these studies
were supported by operational observations of test applications to provide evidence that helped
to demonstrate conformance with the requirements listed above. The following pages argue
that complex interactions between safety and security concerns justify the use of more formal
techniques to support the future development of next generation GNSS.
A further motivation for the use of mathematical reasoning is that safety and security require-
ments extend beyond the underlying SBAS to include the interactive applications that rely on
these infrastructures. This extends formal analysis in novel ways; most formal approaches tend
to focus on an individual level of abstraction. In contrast, many SBAS applications also employ
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) to detect potential faults in the underlying
GNSS measurements. Additional signals, for instance from other satellites arrays, are used to
confirm the fixes derived from the underlying SBAS. RAIM services offer significant benefits to
end users. For instance, they can be used during critical phases of flight, such as an approach,
when the pilot needs to be informed of such inaccuracies as soon as possible. As we shall see,
formal analysis can be used to verify that RAIM warnings support SBAS data during critical
operations. However, mathematical verification techniques must also be extended to consider
a host of human factors issues. For instance, it is unclear whether end users must understand
the underlying reasons why their systems indicate the need to perform a go around when RAIM
alerts identify potential inaccuracies in GNSS data.
2 Security Threats to GNSS Infrastructures
Most of the design concerns that motivated the development of SBAS focussed on safety rather
than security requirements. The existing infrastructures remain vulnerable to a range of attacks.
An early warning was provided by an approach into New Jersey during December 1997. The
crew of a Continental trans-Atlantic flight lost all GPS signals; jeopardising confidence in an
array of on-board systems. It was initially believed that this had been caused by an intentional
jamming attack. It later turned out to have been the unintended result of a US military test. A
200-kilometer interference zone was created by a GPS antenna with a 5-watt signal, stepping
through frequencies.
The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) illustrated the potential threat for maritime navigation
[GWWB09]. A medium powered jamming device generated noise over a pre-defined area of the
UK coastline. This study clearly illustrated the impact that the threats to GNSS integrity can
have upon the end users of these infrastructures. Particular problems were identified for crews
using integrated bridge systems. This technology brings together navigation tools with autopilot
control so that a jammed GPS signal could lead to a significant deviation without warning. Even
if an alert was issued there are significant barriers to identifying the correct position given the
consequent loss of situation awareness. The crews in this trial were all aware that the GPS
signals would be jammed. However, multiple simultaneous alarms rapidly increased the crews
workload as they cross-checked navigational information. The impact for on-board systems was
compounded by the impact of jamming for shore-based services. Numerous errors began to
undermine the Vessel Traffic Services that provide an overview of coastal areas. Some of the
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data returned by vessels was based on incorrect GPS fixes that contradicted radar sources.
Many of the vulnerabilities associated with convention GNSS architectures stem from the
relatively weak signals that are used. A common analogy is to compare GPS output to using the
power of a car headlight across one third of the Earths surface at more than 20,000km. Most
western military organisations can interrupt GNSS signals; simulation software enables planners
to identify the optimal allocation and distribution of jamming systems. The military development
of satellite navigation jamming devices has been mirrored by the increasing availability of hand
held systems that cost little more than $100 and have a range of several kilometres. These
portable technologies can be used in a range of criminal activities for instance, to disrupt the
signals to GPS tracking devices that would otherwise report the location of a stolen vehicle
or shipment. It is illegal to offer these devices for sale within the European Union. This is
because they cannot comply with the existing Electro-Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) directives;
the prohibition was not primarily intended to protect GNSS services. Within the UK, national
legislation prevents the operation of a jammer but it is not illegal to own such a device [Roy11].
Further threats illustrate the relationship between underlying systems vulnerabilities and the
usability of safety-critical SBAS applications. First generation GNSS infrastructures provide
little support for users trying to authenticate signals. This makes it possible to spoof location
information through the broadcast of fake GNSS-like signals or the rebroadcast of valid GNSS
signals. Signal simulation software can be used to recreate the anticipated GPS signals for a
given route using a particular set of waypoints and timing intervals. Coupled with a spoofing
transmitter, these simulators can fool the user into thinking that they are following a specified
route. The problems of designing the simulator and then integrating it with effective, mobile
jamming technologies have created significant barriers to their application for criminal ends.
However, these are likely to be eroded in coming years and the potential threats cannot be dis-
counted. The criminal motivation is proportionate to the diversification of GNSS applications
including route monitoring for toll and insurance pricing.
Some of these concerns are being addressed through technological innovation. For instance,
spoofing will become far more difficult once Galileo begins to provide encrypted signals for use
in safety-related applications. Other threats continue to affect future GNSS architectures. As
mentioned, the design of the EGNOS and Galileo ground based systems focused on meeting ac-
curacy, integrity, availability, continuity and time to alert requirements. Software and hardware
teams were focused on a series of feared events and failure modes. Algorithmic barriers and
standard operating practices, including maintenance procedures, were then created to address
these concerns. Deliberate attacks were not part of this analysis. In consequence, a number of
low level vulnerabilities may persist. Fortunately, the defences that were created in response to
safety concerns also provide protection against potential security threats. The same CRC and
error checking techniques that help to identify potential failure modes can also identify a range
of attacks. There remains some concern as to whether these defences would offer sufficient pro-
tection against insider threats. For instance, most SBAS infrastructures rely on configuration
files that enable operators to respond to the failure of particular components. This increases con-
fidence in meeting the safety requirements, cited above. However it also creates opportunities
for malicious reconfiguration. Similarly, GNSS infrastructures are typically designed to operate
autonomously for short periods of time. Elements of the infrastructure can also be commanded
from more than one ground station. This creates a concern that external agents or insiders could
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spoof legitimate commands or gain temporary control of the infrastructures. This might sound
relatively far-fetched. However, the investment in relatively simple attack modes such as those
used by STUXNET provides a warning of future vulnerabilities as more and more national infras-
tructures rely on satellite based navigation and timing information. These potential threats also
reinforced the point that security concerns extend beyond the scope of an initial safety analysis
into the entire operational life cycle of GNSS architectures through development to deployment
and maintenance.
A recent report from the UK Royal Academy of Engineering [Roy11] argued that 6% of GDP
in Western Countries depends on GNSS technology. It went on to criticise the lack of backup
technologies. At a national level, agencies should monitor and report on disruption to GNSS
signals. At an international level, greater attention should be paid to the vulnerabilities that over-
reliance on this technology is creating in the financial markets. Managerial and operational staff
should prepare for GNSS outages from ten minutes to a month. The RAE team also argued
that GNSS vulnerabilities should be explicitly included in the risk assessments that support crit-
ical infrastructures. The limited scope of the RAE report did not, however, identify formal or
semi-formal techniques that might support such analyses. In contrast, the following paragraphs
identify a range of tools that might increase the resilience of safety-related SBAS applications.
3 High-Level Structures: Semi-Formal Dependability Cases
The safety of Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) depends on many different forms
of evidence, including but not limited to risk assessments, architectural descriptions, develop-
ment standards, test data, independent audits etc. In previous work, we have described how
semi-formal argumentation techniques help to structure these different sources of evidence. In
particular, Johnson and Atencia Yepez [JY11] use this approach to reason about the impact of
security threats for the users of safety-critical GNSS applications. In this approach, the edges of
a graph denote that evidence supports a particular goal. These diagrams support discussion be-
tween stakeholders who often have very different viewpoints on the validity of particular safety
or security arguments. For instance, the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) uses a goal or claim
to represent an assertion that can be assessed as either true or false [KW04]. A developer might
assert that RAIMs techniques are acceptably safe during low probability continuity failures. A
solution can be used to present the evidence that supports a goal or strategy. This is important be-
cause it provides a link between the high level argument structure embedded within GSN and the
more detailed documentation provided by specific development techniques such as Fault Trees,
FMECA, Formal methods etc.
Figure 1 shows how GSN can be used to argue that an SBAS is acceptable safe. This top level
goal can be broken down into sub-claims. In this case, G2 focuses on eliminating or mitigating
the hazards that might undermine the ICAO performance requirements in terms of accuracy, in-
tegrity, continuity and availability. G3 focuses on the need to operate the SBAS according to the
identified Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These goals are placed within the context of
specification and requirements documents including EC Reg 550/2004, EGN SDD SoL etc. Ev-
idence that these sub goals have been addressed can be derived from a range of tests initially on
limited geographical areas and subsequently by more sustained monitoring of ground stations.
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Figure 1: Initial GSN for Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS)
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The EGNOS End to End Simulator (EETES) also provides evidence of robustness against accu-
racy concerns. Solution S4 also shows how evidence from formal analysis techniques, including
model checking, can be integrated into the safety arguments within a GSN.
The semi-formal, safety case structures used to support EGNOS certification for SoL appli-
cations are significantly more complex than that illustrated in Figure 1. A modular approach
was, therefore, developed to structure arguments that addressed low level infrastructure concerns
through to usability issues [JY10]. Part A of the safety case explains why the system has been
designed, developed and deployed in a manner compliant to ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPS). This was coordinated by the European Commission with support from the
European Space Agency as the lead body in the initial design of the EGNOS architecture. In
contrast, Part B argues that the SBAS will be operated and maintained to meet the ICAO SARPs
by the commercial European Satellite Services Provider (ESSP). Additional safety cases are then
required for each of the end-user applications that are built on top of the SBAS SoL architecture.
Goodenough, Lipson and Weinstock [GLW06] have used GSN to analyse security concerns.
In this case, the top level goal demonstrated that the system was acceptably secure. Their ap-
proach focussed on relatively low-level threats to software systems; structuring evidence that
an implementation will not be vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. The arguments still relied
upon a range of human factors claims. For instance, programmers must be trained to avoid vul-
nerabilities in their code. Competent programmers must also be used to review the software.
Goodenough, Lipson and Weinstocks work is particular relevant for this workshop; their assur-
ance cases also integrated evidence from mathematically based tools for static code analysis. It is
possible to identify a number of different ways in which semi-formal argumentation techniques
might integrate security AND safety concerns for interactive systems:
• Integration within a single dependability argument. Under this approach, the top level goal
would be to demonstrate the dependability of a complex system. A first sub-goal would
present the arguments that any implement was acceptably safe. A second sub-goal would
then structure the evidence showing that the system was acceptably secure. This approach
raises a number of concerns in particular, it is difficult to show that some security evidence
has implications for systems safety and vice versa.
• Integration of safety concerns into security assurance cases. This approach would begin
by constructing the security arguments pioneered by Goodenough, Lipson and Weinstock
[GLW06]. Additional nodes might then be introduced into the diagram to distinguish
evidence or arguments about security concerns that might undermine the safety of any
implementation. This approach suffers from a range of practical problems for example, it
is possible to identify potential safety concerns with every threat or vulnerability. However,
there are additional safety hazards that would not be represented in the combined diagram
because they are not strictly related to the original security assurance case.
• Integration of security threats into safety cases. We have chosen to adopt a third approach.
This begins by developing a conventional safety case, such as that illustrated in Figure 1.
The second stage is to use conventional forms of threat and vulnerability analysis to iden-
tify security concerns that were not identified during the previous step. Additional evi-
dence must then be introduced into the hybrod structure to document any additional miti-
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Figure 2: Integrating Security Threats to GNSS Architectures within GSN Safety Arguments
gation that must be introduced to address these security concerns beyond those that were
already considered as part of an initial safety assessment.
Figure 2 shows how safety and security arguments can be integrated into a single graphical struc-
ture [JY11]. The augmented assurance case identifies two safety concerns. The first uses the UK
MOD studies to provide evidence that localised disturbances to GPS or GLONASS signals would
not be visible to an EGNOS ground station. The threats posed from such interference can be mit-
igated through the application of the RAIMs techniques mentioned in previous sections of this
paper. However, the representation of security and safety arguments within an integrated GSN
helps to document the importance of these approaches for the dependability of future applica-
tions. Figure 2 also includes a second set of security concerns based around the potential insider
threat to GNSS infrastructures. These are rarely modelled within simulation environments; how-
ever, coordinated attacks by individuals who are familiar with the ground architecture of an
SBAS system would undermine many of the defences that are intended to mitigate the impact of
individual human errors.
Previous paragraphs have shown how semi-formal assurance cases can be used to represent
and reason about the interaction between security and safety concerns in complex, interactive
systems. These graphical structures collate the many diverse forms of evidence, including formal
analysis, that support dependability arguments. They are particularly appropriate for SBAS and
GNSS applications where the quality of end-user interaction is determined by the interaction of
Proc. FMIS 2011 8 / 18
ECEASST
multiple infrastructures each supported by the cooperation of many different commercial and
regulatory organisations.
A number of caveats can be raised about the use of the hybrid technique, illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. For instance, the EGNOS safety case is divided into different parts addressing the design,
implementation and operation of the underlying infrastructures. Further components have been
developed to demonstrate that particular applications are acceptably safe. It remains to be seen
whether it is possible to trace the impact of particular threats and vulnerabilities across these
different boundaries to identify the impact that particular cyber attacks might have upon the end
users of GNSS data. Further limitations stem from the qualitative and semi-formal nature of
most safety cases. This limits the inferences that can be drawn about the potential impact of
safety hazards and security threats. In order to look for more quantitative support, we must look
more closely at the techniques that can be used to obtain the evidence, which is documented in
the nodes of an assurance case.
4 Lower-Level Analysis: Boolean DrivenMarkov Processes (BDMP)
Safety argumentation techniques, such as the GSN used in Figures 1 and 2, provide a graphical
means of integrating evidence from formal analysis with the products from other safety-related
software engineering processes that are required by most development standards and by regu-
latory agencies. This is important because formal methods are not sufficient in themselves to
support the design, implementation and operation of most complex GNSS applications; they
must be augmented by risk analysis techniques, by functional testing and usability studies, by
environmental and observational data etc. This section goes on to look at one formal approach
that can be used to consider both safety and security requirements, while reinforcing these initial
links between complementary development techniques.
Boolean Driven Markov Processes (BDMPs) have strong similarities to more conventional
fault trees that have been supported the development of many different safety-related interfaces.
Bouissou and Bon [BB03] provide an overview of the approach and explain one important dif-
ference with the BDMP semantics. Boolean Driven Markov Processes extend conventional Fault
Trees with triggers that are represented by dotted arrows similar to the priority AND gates that
have been integrated into some Fault Trees. The target of the arrow is activated if the source
state occurs. These relationships between the leaf nodes in the BDMP can be formalised within
Markov Processes, the use of Boolean logic embedded in the tree notation also helps to reduce
the potential state space explosion associated with conventional Markov Processes in applica-
tions as complex as the GNSS described in this paper.
Figure 3 introduces the annotations that provide a bridge between the fault tree components
and the underlying Markov Processes [BB03]. Figure 4 goes on to apply the approach to model
N-2 safety-related failures involving GNSS implementations. Each of the diagrams illustrates
how multiple independent failures can undermine the confidence and situation awareness of end-
users by interrupting the provision of navigation and timing information. In Figure 4 a) there is
a probability that the RAIMs secondary system will fail to provide a correct location when it is
needed following the loss of a primary SBAS fix. In contrast, Figure 4 b) considers the situation
in which the RAIMs fault may occur before the loss of SBAS; this might happen during a fail
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Figure 3: BDMP Annotations following Bouissou and Bon (2003)
silent problem or as a result of incorrect configuration, maintenance etc. Figure 4 c) illustrates
how these two different scenarios can be combined within the same BDMP model.
Pie`tre-Cambacie´die`s and Bouissou, [PB10b] have recently extended Boolean Driven Markov
Processes to represent and reason about security threats for complex systems. This approach
borrows many of the concepts that have been embedded with the attack trees that are themselves
based on concepts from Fault Tree notations. As before, the intention is to associate Markov
Processes with the leaf nodes of the tree structures. These leaves are used to represent the actions
of potential attackers; they capture important state changes that describe whether an attack has
been executed or not, whether it can be detected or not once it has begun and so forth. The
Markov processes describe the probability of that node being true; this creates the opportunity to
develop an executable semantics from the notation in which a state transition in the underlying
process will trigger the leaf node to become true. Figure 5 summarises the security extensions to
the BDMP modelling language.
Pie`tre-Cambacie´die`s and Bouissou [PB10a] provide a more complete introduction to the syn-
tax and semantics of this integrated approach to security and safety modelling. However, the
language continues to be refined as further applications test the expressive completeness of the
annotations illustrated in Figure 3 and 5. Figure 6 builds on this previous work and applies the
security extensions to represent a malicious attack on an SBAS infrastructure. In this case, the
attacker acts to disable a RAIM implementation before undermining the GNSS infrastructure.
Any attack on the SBAS would have little impact if the receiver autonomous monitoring systems
could detect and respond to the failure.
Figure 6 illustrates an important strength of the BDMP approach. The probability of an attack
on both the RAIM and SBAS implementation might be very low. However, the UK government
has recently acknowledged that greater consideration needs to be paid to what are known as
N-2 vulnerabilities. These characterise low probability, high consequence failures of multiple
infrastructures where there may be hidden interdependencies for instance, the insider threat
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Figure 4: BDMP Modelling of Primary and Backup Systems
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Figure 5: BDMP Security Annotations following Pie`tre-Cambacie´die`s and Bouissou, (2010)
from a common infrastructure provider (software or hardware) cannot be discounted for both
RAIMs and SBAS technologies.
Figure 7 extends the BDMP approach to consider a hybrid vulnerability in which external
attacks exploit wider failures in a national critical infrastructure. In diagram A, the attacker
waits until there is a failure in the RAIM infrastructure before mounting an attack on the SBAS
infrastructure. This does not seem a plausible scenario given that the attacker would need to
know that the failure had occurred and that the users of an SBAS application would continue
operation without the support of the RAIM implementation before they launched their attack.
This formalisation is important because it provides the basis for discounting certain lines of
attack providing this decision can be validated by a broad range of stakeholders. In contrast,
diagram B models a scenario in which the attacker disables the RAIM implementation and allows
the system to continue operating until there is a subsequent fault in the SBAS application. Again
the plausibility of the attack mode might be questioned; however, this scenario describes the
insertion of a latent threat that has significant potential to compromise the safety and security of
many complex systems.
Figure 8 builds on the BDMP extensions to construct a model that integrates accidental faults
with malicious attacks on both the RAIMs and SBAS infrastructures. As can be seen, the RAIMs
for an end-user application might be disabled either through a fault or through an attack. This
would lead to a loss of navigation and timing information if it were followed by the failure of an
SBAS infrastructure either through an attack or fault. The same consequences would arise if the
loss of the SBAS were to be followed by a failure on demand for the RAIM implementation.
The links between BDMP diagrams and fault trees enable the use of minimal cut set al-
gorithms to identify the different scenarios that might compromise the operation of complex,
safety-critical systems. Integrated diagrams, such as that illustrated by Figure 8, can be also
drive the quantitative analysis of attack and failure scenarios using the underlying Markov Pro-
cesses that support each of the lead nodes. Their analysis is intended to derive the probability of
an undesired event within a given period of time or the mean time in which this event will oc-
cur. Pie`tre-Cambacie´die`s and Bouissou [PB10b] show how these models can be used to suggest
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potential vulnerabilities in these integrated models. Their work focuses on the quantitative anal-
ysis of pollution incidents. However, their results can be extended to our case study. In systems
whose mission time is short it is better to conduct a malicious attack on both infrastructures even
though the probability of success might be relatively small. The probability of detection is also
constrained by the limited time exposure. Over longer periods of operation, or if an attack takes
longer to mount, it is better for the attacker to use a hybrid approach. For example, malicious
code might be inserted into a RAIMs implementation and triggered during accidental problems
in the operation or configuration of a GNSS. This attack strategy could be reversed if there was a
higher probability of detection associated with the RAIMs compared to the SBAS infrastructure.
In either case, the relatively low probability of detection for malicious code inserted by an insider
remains a significant concern across most critical infrastructures.
In order to support this quantitative, integrated use of BDMP for security and safety assess-
ments we must define values for in-operation (λ ) and on-demand failures (γ). It is also important
to model the probability that an attack action will be successful (β ). The probability of active
failure for the SBAS in Figure 8 can be derived from existing safety case evidence, mentioned
previously. The probability of the active loss and the on-demand failure of RAIMs implementa-
tions can be derived from application specific safety assessments, e.g. supporting ICAO Required
Navigation Performance criteria. However, the remaining values are less clear cut. How can one
assess the probability of a successful attack on a RAIMs implementation or an SBAS infras-
tructure? It is for this reason that we have not attempted to calculate the derived values from
the Markov Processes; there are further concerns over attempts to accurately assess the existing
vulnerabilities of a critical component of European infrastructures. Some national agencies have
argued that the managers of key systems must act as though state sponsored cyber attacks have
a probability of one. In other words, the design, management and operation of critical systems
must be guided by the assumption that they will be the target of external agencies. This simpli-
fies some aspects of the quantitative assessments, security analysts can focus on the probability
of detection before any intrusion has the potential to affect the end users of the underlying in-
frastructure. The hybrid BDMP analysis in Figure 8 provides a framework for this more detailed
work.
5 Conclusions
Previous generations of Global Navigation Satellite Systems could not be used for safety-related
applications. Ionospheric interference and multipath signals combined to create problems of
accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity. The underlying architectures provided no guar-
antees about the time taken to alert the end users to potential problems. These issues have all
recently been addressed through the development of Safety of Life extensions for Satellite Based
Augmentation Systems. In consequence, the European Commission has supported the certifi-
cation of these infrastructures for applications ranging from precision approaches to runways
through to advanced railway signalling systems. Similar provisions have been made for the
use of the North American North American Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and the
Asian Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS).
A range of tools and techniques have been used to support the development and operation of
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SBAS infrastructures. These include conventional risk assessment methods, such as HAZOPS
and FMECA. They also include a range of empirical tests both on the ground and space based
components. Formal analysis has been applied to represent and reason about the algorithms
used to calculate necessary corrections to the GPS and GLONASS signals. Usability tests have
also supported the systems engineering and configuration tools used in the operation of SBAS
infrastructures. Graphical argumentation techniques have been used to gather this evidence into
a coherent structure that demonstrates augmentation infrastructures are acceptably safe within a
range of different contexts.
At the same time that satellite based augmentation systems have been approved for location
and timing information in safety-critical interfaces, a range of organisations including the US
Department of Defense and UK Ministry of Defence; have raised concerns about increasing civil
vulnerability to attacks on the underlying infrastructures. These vulnerabilities are compounded
by a range of human factors concerns; the more that end users begin to rely on navigation and
timing infrastructures then the greater the consequences will be for any interruption to those ser-
vices. Previous studies by the MoD and by the FAA have shown that crews suffer a significant
loss of situation awareness when there is any interruption to GNSS infrastructures. The integra-
tion of navigation and timing data into a wide range of applications also undermines operators
confidence in a host of interactive systems, not simply those that report on their present location.
For example, studies of GNSS jamming have shown that relatively cheap devices undermine a
host of maritime bridge information systems and shore based traffic monitoring applications.
Further concerns arise because it is unclear how to represent and reason about the safety con-
cerns that are created by the diverse security threats to GNSS architectures, including spoofing
and the insider threat to both space and ground based systems. Such security concerns invalidate
many of the assumptions that support the provision of critical services. One approach would be
to extend the application of argumentation techniques such as GSN from safety-related applica-
tions to represent security argumentation. Several examples have been developed to show how
this can be done for a range of software applications. However, this suffers from a number of
limitations. In particular, it can be difficult to represent and reason about the impact that security
threats might have upon underlying safety arguments. We have, therefore, extended previous
approaches to show how security threats might be used to challenge the evidence that supports
arguments about GNSS Safety of Life applications. The intention is to provide an integrated,
risk-based approach to the identification of attack scenarios that can help assess the resilience of
safety cases to security threats across the life cycle extending from design to maintenance and
operation.
The integration of security concerns into safety cases helps to sketch the potential conse-
quences of a malicious attack on an underlying SBAS. A key benefit is that the safety case
provides a means of collating the diverse sources of evidence from design, testing and analysis
summarised above. However, this evidence must be derived using other tools and techniques. It
is for this reason that this paper has also presented a means of analysing the more detailed in-
teractions between the security and safety of GNSS. In particular, we have shown how Boolean
Driven Markov Processes help to avoid some of the state explosion limitations of conventional
Markov techniques using extensions to the well-known Fault Tree notation. An important ben-
efit of this approach is that it has already been developed to consider attacks on safety-related
applications. However, it has not previously been applied to consider failure modes and security
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threats to critical infrastructures, such as the SBAS described in this paper.
Much remains to be done. In particular, the quantitative application of the Markov processes
relies upon estimates of the likelihood of successful attacks on elements of the SBAS infras-
tructure. This, in turn, must be validated by expert judgement across a range of stakeholders
including the designers and operators of the infrastructure components, the end users of the
GNSS applications as well as national intelligence agencies similar to the UK Centre for the
Protection of National Infrastructure. The elicitation of these estimates reinforces the close inte-
gration between human factors and formal analysis that is a recurring theme in this work and in
any study to address the interactions between security and safety.
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